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BESTIMMUNGSFAKTOREN FÜR DIE ÜBERTRAGUNG VON NUTZUNGSRECHTEN VON 
GRASLAND IM LICHTE DES INSTITUTIONELLEN WANDELS: 
BEWEISE AUS PASTORALEN IN CHINA 
 
DETERMINANTS OF GRASSLAND USE RIGHT TRANSFER IN INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE: 
EVIDENCE FROM PASTORAL CHINA 
 
Zusammenfassung: Der Artikel befasst sich mit Einflußfaktoren des Leasings von Grasland in 
China und soll einen Beitrag zur Debatte über die Ausbreitung und Intensivierung von 
Graslandaktivitäten in weiten vulnerablen Regionen des Landes leisten. Basierend auf besondere 
Merkmale des institutionellen  Wandels im Grasland sowie die Analyse von, in 12 Dörfern 
erhobenen empirischen Daten, werden bestimmten Variablen wie beispielsweise 
graslandbezogene Verfügungs-  und Nutzungsrechte, Graslandrichtlinien, und Eigenschaften 
involvierter Akteuren in ihrer Wirkung auf dem Leasing von Grasland untersucht. Der Artikel 
lenkt eine besondere Aufmerksamkeit sowohl auf die weitverbreiteten illegalen 
Beweidungsaktivitäten, die Durchsetzung von beweidungsbezogenen Quoten als auch deren 
Einfluss auf dem Leasing sowie Gouvernance von Grasland.             
Schlüsselwörter: Landnutzen, Landbesitz, Graslandleasing, China 
Abstract: This paper focuses on factors influencing grassland lease, which will contribute to the 
heated debate about land use in China by extending to more extensive and vulnerable grassland 
regions. Based on review of grassland institutional change and analysis of data from 12 villages, 
this paper examines the impact of variables such as grassland property rights, grazing policies 
and physical attributes of actors on grassland lease. This paper also draws attention to widely 
existed illegal grazing and the implementation of grazing quota, as well as their impact on 
grassland lease and governance.   
Keywords: Land Use, Land Ownership and Tenure, Grassland lease, China 
 
1 Introduction 
Located in the eastern Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region, Yanchi County is bounded by Shanxi 
province, Gansu province and Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region. It is in the transition zone 
from Loess Plateau to Ordos Desert, as well as the transition zone from arid steppe to semi-arid 
grassland. Among its total 713,000 hectares lands, 557,000 hectares is grassland. The climate in 
Yanchi County is continental climate, with average 272mm rainfall per year  (Qi et al., 
2006).Grassland not only provides irreplaceable ecological environment for local people’s daily 
life, but is also an essential  factor influencing local economic development. Although the 2 
 
contribution of livestock on local Gross  Domestic  Product  (GDP)  has declined from 26.0% 
(2000) to 15.3% (2009), livestock kept on the grassland still constitute 31.23% of the per capita 
net income of farmer
1
The  rest  of  this paper  is organized as follows. Section2  introduces  institutions related to 
grassland governance, mainly about current  grassland property rights  and  grazing policies. 
Section 3 lists the theoretical hypothesis of grassland lease. It predicts that grazing policies, de 
facto property rights of grassland, and biophysical conditions will affect grassland lease. Section 
4  introduces  the methodology employed in this research including  research strategy and 
.During last decades, grassland degradation and desertification  have 
become more and more severe in Yanchi. Before 2002, 79.3% of its total land suffered from 
serious desertification. In recent years, local people are frequently hit by natural disasters caused 
by extreme weather, such as extreme drought. 
Grassland lease exists when there is a gap between the amount of grassland that actors wish to 
have and the amount of grassland that they owned in reality. Grassland lease appears to eliminate 
this  gap by leasing in or leasing out grassland. In this paper, grassland lease, especially 
operational-level grassland lease, refers to a mechanism through which a voluntary transaction in 
grassland use right is leased within rural households. The term ”transaction” follows Common’s 
definition which treats a transaction as a unit of lease of legal control, that is, to involve the 
transference of property rights (Hagedorn 2008). Empirical research results show  that the 
occurrence and forms of grassland lease varied in last decades. During certain period grassland 
lease declined dramatically, and it boomed in some areas while depressed in other areas in the 
same time. Considering institutional change during that  period, this phenomenon draws our 
attention on the determinants of grassland lease. What is the role of institutional change on 
grassland lease? What is the impact of other variables such as grassland size, location, fence on 
grassland  lease? Why did  some grassland lease  happen exclusively  in certain situation, for 
example, grazing quota lease? 
This paper would contribute to the heated debate on land use in rural China by engaging in 
more extensive and vulnerable grassland regions. Nowadays, more and more scholars are paying 
attention to arable land tenure (Guo Li, et al. 1998; Brandt et al. 2002; Kung et al.1997) and 
arable land lease  (Li 2003;  Brandt et  al. 2002; Slangen et al., 2008) in rural China. 
Comparatively, grassland lease and its determinants is a topic under research. The situations that 
illegalize grassland lease or lack of protection for lease are presumed to lead to inefficiency. As 
Ostrom (2003) stressed that rights to their use will be leased to those who will allocate them to 
their highest value use. Leasing appears to be an important mechanism through which the rural 
economy is able to redistribute  resources and improve production  efficiency.  In addition, in 
recent decades, the increasing migration causes a huge amount of abundant grassland. Grassland 
lease could dramatically raise land utilization ratio under such circumstance. This article also 
analyzes  the relationship between institutions and grassland lease  under  certain biophysical 
conditions, which would shed lights on how types of property rights and related policies jointly 
affect grassland lease. 3 
 
techniques. Section 5 illustrates  and interprets empirically  results.  Concluding remarks are 
contained in section 6.  
2 Institutions related to grassland governance in research area 
Grassland decentralization reform was implemented in 1990s in Ningxia Hui Autonomous 
Region, after the introduction of Household Responsibility System(HRS) for arable land (Lin 
1992), which redefined farmland tenure arrangement by allocating land-use rights to individual 
households, despite the ongoing collective ownership of land (Banks et al, 2003). Grassland is 
managed under a similar HRS, albeit with slight differences due to the unique features of 
grassland, such as difficulties in demarcation (Banks et al.2003). The decentralization reform 
aimed to contract grassland use right to individual household. While the heterogeneity of villages 
such as grassland size, cultivation type and location promote diversified property right regime in 
the end. Villagers possess not the ownership but use rights. The degree of grassland allocation 
often  varied  (Ho 2000; Banks, Richard et al. 2003; Nelson 2006).Some grassland were 
contracted to individual household as policy encouraged, while in some areas with quite limited 
grassland, it was assigned to groups with several households, and some even maintain status quo 
situation (i.e., owned and managed by community). The valid time of the contract is 50 years. 
Until 2003, 317,000 hectares grassland, about 86.6% of its total grassland, had been contracted, 
among which 56,000 hectares grassland were allocated to individual households, and 261,000 
hectares grassland had been contracted in the form of groups of 5-6 households. 
However, the real situation is much more complicated. Property right regimes explained above 
were de jure rights systems since it is lawfully recognized by formal, legal instrumentalities 
(Schlager et al.,1992). Property rights may also originate from resource users by cooperatively 
define and enforce rights among themselves. This could be called de facto rights when they are 
not recognized by government authorities (Schlager et al., 1992). In Yanchi, some grassland 
supposed to be contracted to individuals are not realized due to the fuzzy boundary of grassland, 
and it is quite common that some contracted to groups in de jure property right system are still 
owned and managed by community.  
In addition, several grazing policies were carried in last decade, responding to the increasingly 
severe desertification. As one of the most influential land extreme policies, grazing ban policy 
was issued in 2002 in Yanchi County. The grassland use right was restricted by the policy. 
Captive breeding was encouraged by government. Admittedly, to some extent,  the policy 
fostered the recovery of vegetation,  improved the quality of grass  and  stimulated  the 
intensification of husbandry (Liu et al.2007). However, grassland desertification situation was 
not alleviated as expected, with about 0.297 million square kilometers  (44.7% of land) in 
Ningxia being devoured by desertification (Qi et al. 2006). Moreover, it forced local people to 
abandon  herding, which used  to be the  most important traditional livelihood. As a result, 
conflicts between government and local people were intensified. More importantly, grazing ban 
policy greatly limited alternative livelihood strategies for those who stay in villages. Increasing 
young  rural migrants  leave  a huge amount of farmland uncultivated. Rural brain drain  thus 4 
 




were selected by local government as pilot areas for a grazing open project 
in 2006. Farmers in pilot villages were permitted to use grassland despite the ban grazing policy. 
The pilot areas were expanded to the whole town in the next year (Table1). However, this pilot 
project was suspended after 2008 due to extremely drought in the following years.  
Table 1: Information of different regulations in Yanchi County 
Grazing ban policy  Grazing open pilot project 
Time  Since Nov.1st,2002  2006   2007 
place  Whole county with 8 
towns, 98 administration 
villages, 675 natural 
villages 
1 administration village with 10 
natural villages, covering 
1001.2 hectares grassland  
15 administration villages with 
96 natural villages, covering 
54906.6 hectares grassland 
Main 
content 
All activities related to 
grassland  were  banned; 
captive breeding was 
highly recommended and 
subsidized. 
In pilot area, local people  were allowed to  graze  sheep on 
grassland. Grazing quota was assigned by county government to 
each household based on the quality of grassland in the village, 
and then allocated to each household based on grassland size 
household owns. Rotational grazing was encouraged by 
government.  
Source: data collected in empirical research (2010) 
3 Literature Review and Hypothesis 
Hypothesis 1 Grassland fence is expected to exert a positive impact on grassland lease by 
clarifying de facto property right, decreasing the difficulty of exclusion and the transaction cost 
of grassland lease. 
The grassland in research area is defined as a common-pool resource, since each person’s use 
of a resource system subtracts units of that resource from a finite total amount available for 
harvesting while hard to exclude other beneficiaries from benefits (Ostrom, 2005). However, 
common-pool resources are not automatically associated with common-property regimes, or with 
any other particular type of property right. It may be owed by national, regional or local 
governments, by communal groups or by, private individuals or corporations (ibid.). Existing 
literatures provide successful or unsuccessful cases for common-pool resource governance by 
different groups such as government, communal groups (Ostrom, 1990; Jun Li, 2007; Banks, 
2003).As stated above, Yanchi grassland provides a good example of diversity of property right 
regimes  in common-pool resource.  Some grassland contracted to groups are still used  and 
managed by community since there is no specific boundary of group grassland. Some Grassland 
contracted to individual households is managed by group or even community for the same reason. 
Without a specific and visible boundary of grassland, de jure grassland property rights are hard 
to  be implemented.  It is hard to distinguish the boundaries of grassland without artificial 
mechanism such as grassland fence building(Banks et al. 2003).It has been pointed by some 
scholars (Cornes et al.,1994;Ostrom, 2003) that to understand the capacity of exclusion depends 
both on the technology of physical exclusion devices, such as barbed wire fences, as well as the 
existence and enforcement of various bundles of property rights. Grassland fence is the 5 
 
technology commonly used because the local government provides subsidy for fence and the 
cost is relatively low. Therefore, it is reasonable to define de facto grassland property right 
regime based on fence situation. Grassland with village fence shares the same attributes  of 
common-property regime. Grassland with individual household fence could be classified to a 
quasi private-property regime. As to grassland with group fence, it is categorized to a group-
property regime. 
Grassland fence is believed to have positive impacts on grassland lease since it determines de 
facto grassland property rights by clarifying the boundaries of grassland, which diminishes the 
cost of excluding other potential beneficiaries. Even for grassland contracted to group, grassland 
fence is expected to exert a positive impact on grassland lease since it allows for greater external 
exclusion, while the cost is relatively lowered than individualized tenure  case  (Banks, 
2003).Besides, grassland fence would contribute to grassland lease since it diminishes the 
transaction cost by simplifies the leasing process and in this way, grassland transferred would be 
less ambiguous or controversial. It also enables the formalization of grassland lease from oral 
agreement and produces written document feasible by defining specific and visual boundary of 
grassland. In the case of individual grassland fence, potential conflict between a tenant and a 
landowner resulted from the boundary of grassland will be solved by construction of grassland 
fence. 
In addition, compared with grassland with fence to larger unit (i.e., fence to village), grassland 
with fence to smaller unit (i.e., fence to individual household) is expected to have higher 
probability of being leased, which means that the more decentralized property right system the 
actors  involved, the more possible  grassland  would be leased.  Because ambiguous rights 
originated from less decentralize property right system lead to inefficiency since actors cannot or 
have difficulty to trade their interest in such system for other goods or money. Moreover, the 
potential actors interested in goods with less decentralized property right are quite limited since 
actors involved in such system usually have to face the conflict among other owners in same 
system. Hypothetically, if one actor wants to rent grassland under group property right system 
from a group of households, the agreement has  to be achieved between the actor and all 
households of the group. The transaction cost is much higher, compared with negotiation within 
two households.  
Hypothesis2  Grazing policies have profound influence on grassland lease, and grazing ban 
policy is expected to have a negative impact on it.  
As Ostrom (2005) asserts,  “rules affect the types of actions that individuals can take the 
benefits and costs of those actions and potential outcomes and the likely outcomes achieved”. 
When grazing policy is implemented to regularize the use of grassland, it does impose a 
constraint  on  grassland use and change  the incentives actors face. On the one hand, as 
transactions are  institutionalized, actors will adjust their choices to the new rules and 
enforcement mechanism (Hagedorn 2008).  We assume that when grassland use is 
institutionalized by a grazing ban policy, it is probable that the actors will adjust their choices to 6 
 
reduce grassland use which inevitably decreases incentive to lease grassland use rights. With a 
grazing ban policy, grassland is enclosed for vegetation recovery and not for grazing. Villagers 
are required  to change the pattern of raising  livestock from grazing to captive breeding. 
Therefore  the  incentives for grassland lease are  reduced.  The  lease  probability  will  drop 
dramatically under such  circumstance, in particular in  the first a  few years when official 
monitoring  of illegal grazing was extremely intensive and restrict. Illegal grazing happened 
frequently in recent year since the official monitoring was much looser especially in evening. 
Accordingly, we assume that the incentive of leasing grassland use rights gradually increased 
due to lower transaction cost. The economic value of grassland increases since the risk of being 
sanctioned fori llegal grazing by government decreased. In addition, we also consider the impact 
of grazing open pilot project on grassland lease. It is reasonable to consider that the open grazing 
policy will stimulate grassland lease. The grazing open policy provides a formally recognized 
and authorized arena for grassland use right lease  by legalizing grazing activity. Hence the 
transaction cost reduced greatly.    
The location of grassland would also influence grassland lease. In the studied region, 
grassland location can be divided into two parts, in hill or in plain. As Ostrom (2003) stated 
whether it is difficult or costly to develop physical or institutional means to exclude non-
Hypothesis 3 Physical attributes of the community will also influence individual’s decision-
making on grassland lease.  
Evidence from existing  research shows that the same policy may yields entirely different 
actions because of the various characteristics of actors. Individuals’ incentives are also affected 
by attributes of the biophysical and material condition. As Ostrom (2005) stressed that human 
actions are also affected by other attributes that how institutions combine with biophysical 
conditions to generate positive or negative incentives. What actions are physically possible, what 
outcomes can be produced… are affected by the world being acted upon in a situation. This is 
also supported by Hagedorn (2008) that physical world (and related physical properties of a 
transaction) is as important as the social world (and the related physical characteristics of actors). 
For institutional analysis, in the case of grassland lease, Banks et al. (2003) identified several 
physical attributes of grassland, including ecological fragility, remoteness from residential 
quarters, difficulties in demarcation and heavy reliance on group enforcement of any policy and 
legal measures. The model Bliss et al., (1981) developed implies that leasing decisions are 
closely related to the bullock, family worker, and land endowments of rural household in India, 
which was then proved again by Taslim (1992). 
The size of grassland might affect actors’ incentives. The size of the resource could cause 
different consequences of institutions. The larger the grassland individual household possess, the 
more benefit the grassland originated, therefore higher incentives actors have for grassland 
utilization, either through grazing sheep or leasing to others.  
beneficiaries depends both on the availability and cost of relevant technologies... and the 
relationship of cost of these solutions to the expected benefits of achieving exclusion. Generally, 7 
 
it is costly and more difficult to build grassland fence in hills than in plain. Besides, the 
geography attributes of grassland in hilly areas could reduce the incentive of grassland lease, not 
only because it is hard to graze in those places due to its complicated geography but also because 
transportation cost is high. Usually the hilly areas are remote and hard to reach from the 
residential areas.  
Irrigated farmland is expected to have a positive impact on grassland lease. As stated above, 
grassland is usually leased as an appendage to irrigation farmland. It is reasonable to assume that 
the type of farmland would be a determinant of decision on grassland lease. In addition, farmers 
will spread the risk of production in order to smooth their income (Ellis, 2000). 
4 Methodology 
According to research questions, a combination of qualitative and quantitative methods has 
been employed during the empirical research and data analysis. Participatory rural appraisal was 
employed in each village to get the general information of village, including geography 
information, population, self-governing organizations and so on. Village-level data was collected 
by key informant interviews.  
4.1 Sampling procedure 
Twelve villages were selected along with the poverty alleviation offices and a local NGO to 
take into consideration of more diversified physical attributes influencing grazing activities. The 
criteria to be considered included the average grassland in a village, fence situation, and arable 
land situation. We took average grassland per person in a village as an indicator. The sample 
covered four villages with more than 100 mu3 grassland size per person, 4 villages with less than 
100 while more than 50 per person and four villages with less than 50 mu per person. Fence 
situation of grassland is included as an indicator of de facto management units: fence to village, 
fence to groups and fence to individual households. Grazing policies implementation is also 
considered during case selection. Four pilot villages with an open grazing policy implemented 
since 2007 and 8 villages with a grazing ban policy since 2002 have been selected in village 
sample selection. 
At household level, a random sample selection has been conducted. According to research 
plan, 10 questionnaires should be collected in each of the 12 village. While due to increasing 
migration, it is hard to find 10 household who raise sheep in some villages. Therefore, we 
modify the number of questionnaires for each village according to village population in the 
process of data collection. In the end, 111 questionnaires have been collected by face to face 
interview directly conducted by the project team, which ensures high accuracy of data. Fourty-
two households are located in four natural villages with open grazing policy, and 69 are from the 
eight natural villages with ban grazing policy. In order to test the impact of grazing policies on 
grassland lease, we used questionnaire to trace back the situations of grassland and grassland 
lease in three periods including the implementation of grazing ban policy (2003), the 
enforcement of open grazing policy (2007), and recent years (2009).  8 
 
 
Tabel2: Attributes of selected villages 
The scale of grassland 
(unit: mu/person) 























33.3  16.7  50.0  33.3  33.3  66.7  41.7  58.3 
4.2 Multivariable Analysis 
The probit model is employed to analyze determinants of grassland lease. The ordinal 
regression model is a nonlinear model in which the magnitude of change in the outcome 
probability for a given change in one of the independent variables depends on the levels of all of 
the independent variables (Long et al., 2001). The likelihood of grassland lease is treated in the 
modal as an ordinal dependent variable (P). It represents the probability that a household makes 
the decision to lease grassland. Otherwise, 1-P represents the likelihood that a household decides 
not to lease. Although the villagers only possess nominal grassland use right, they still can lease 
it to others. In order to avoid double counting, we only count the number of the households who 
lease in grassland, instead of the figure of leasing out. We calculate two types of grassland lease. 
One is directly renting the grassland, and the other is renting grazing quota, as the amount of 
sheep that can be grazed in grassland of individual household is regulated. From primary 
statistics, we notice that the latter type of lease mainly took place in village implementing 
grazing open pilot project in 2006 and 2007.  
The hypothesis formulated in Section 3 pointed out that, variables including irrigated land size 
(ir), dry land size (dr), grassland per household (gr), fence unit (fence), location of village (l) and 
types of grazing policy (policy) will influence grassland use right lease. Accordingly, such 
variables are included into the model to explore their impact on the probability of grassland lease: 
 
The amount of irrigated land (ir), dry land (dr) and grassland (gr) each household has are 
measured in unit of mu. The dummy variable l refers to the location of grassland as a control 
variable to reflect whether grassland is located in a hilly (0) or plain area (1). The dummy 
variable policy represents grazing policies. When policy=1, it means an open grazing policy. 
When policy=0, it refers to a ban grazing policy. The categorical variable fence refers to de facto 
property rights regimes of grassland in natural villages. In reality, de jure property rights regimes 
hardly function without clear boundaries defined by grassland fence. In the surveyed area, even 
if grassland is allocated to households, it might be managed at collective, group or household 
level depending on fence situation. Therefore we use the situation of fence as a proxy for de 
facto property rights regimes of grassland which takes the value of 0 and 1, meaning non-private 
property right (i.e., collective and group property right) and private property right respectively.  9 
 
5 Empirical Results 
5.1Attributes of dependent variables  
   Lease contract provides a physical area for grassland use right lease. It defines the boundaries 
of a transaction: what is leased during the transaction, how long is this transaction valid, and 
what are the responsibilities of tenants and landowner. We found that there are different types of 
grassland leasing, and the commonly existing practice works by oral agreement instead of 
written document within a short period, usually one or two years, between two households living 
in same village. Landowners usually lease out all his or her grassland to one tenant. Only 22% 
households leased grassland by written agreement. However, all of these agreements only consist 
of lease time, lease price, and contractors, having no specific terms on responsibility of 
contractors and rules about violation of  the contract. Mutual trustworthy based on past life 
experience is one of the essential factors influencing contractors’ decision making. Another type 
of grassland lease is to rent both the grassland and farmland instead of renting grassland 
separately. It does happen in villages with irrigation farmland. Due to severe scarcity of farmland, 
the comparatively higher economic value of farmland generates farmland leasing market before 
the appearance of grassland lease. Under such circumstance, in villages with irrigation farmland, 
sometimes grassland is taken as a bundled product of farmland lease, and this kind of lease 
contract tends to be more formal than usual one (i.e., signed by contractors in written agreement).  
In field research, there are 23 cases of grassland lease in 2007, among which 10 were in 
villages under grazing open policy. Additionally, grazing quota lease become quite popular in 
these villages. Since quota system allocates grazing quota based on household’s grassland size, 
quota lease is also included in grassland lease in this research. In a village with group grassland 
fence, the village leader told us that about 60% household leased in or leased out grassland 
during the implementation of grazing open project. Six cases of grazing quota lease were found 
in field research. In in-depth examining, we found out that these four households were located in 
the village with group management unit of grassland. For these people, what they lease in was 
not grassland but grazing quota. It is easier to lease the quota instead of leasing the grassland in 
villages with group property. Grazing quota provides a well arena for grassland lease. 
In village without specific fence, the probability of grassland lease (0) is lower than that in 
village with group fence (12.9%) or household fence (34.2%). It supports the Hypothesis 1, 
which proposes that the probability of grassland lease is expected to be higher in grassland with 
fence to smaller unit than in grassland with fence to larger unit. The result also reveals a positive 
correlation between grassland size and grassland lease. The percentage of grassland lease in area 
of per capita average grassland less than 50 mu is 11.1%, from 50 to 100 mu is 17.6%, and more 
than 100 mu is 28%. 
5.2 Primary statistic description of independent variables 
  The distribution of households and some of their characteristics are shown in Table 3.  It is 
interesting to notice that there are still 13 households leasing the grassland in villages with the 10 
 
ban grazing policy, which is out of our expectation that no grassland lease would exist under the 
constraint of the grazing ban policy. This might be caused by cases of grassland leasing in 
villages with grazing ban policy. According to our assumption, considering the compulsory 
constraint originated from grazing ban policy, no grassland leasing should exist in these villages. 
However, the appearance of illegal grazing totally changes the assumption. With the gradual 
improvement of environment, conflicts between herders and government occurred frequently in 
monitoring. Because of high financial and labor cost for monitoring, policy implementation tends 
to be loose in recent years. In field research, we found that illegal grazing was popular despite of 
the implementation of the grazing ban  policy. More than 54% people admit that they were 
grazing every day in 2010. Usually, illegal grazing happens in mid-night since the monitoring 
becomes loose during that time. Moreover herders are familiar with local geography while the 
governmental monitoring committee usually doesn’t, so it is easy for herders to avoid monitoring 
in the evening. The cost of grazing is much lower than captive breeding (Qi et al.  2006). This is 
the main reason for the frequent occurrence of illegal grazing. Apparently, the possibility of 
grazing illegally increases the economic value of grassland; therefore it enhances the incentives 
for grassland leasing.  
Table3: Features of the households and villages 
Variable  Obs  Mean  Std.Dev.  Min  Max 
The amount of grassland leased  111  0.207  0.407  0  1 
Irrigated land   111  7.910  12.00  0  50 
Dry land  111  30.15  24.34  0  90 
Grassland   111  346.0  243.3  0  1080 
The location of grassland  111  0.793  0.407  0  1 
De facto property rights regimes  111  0.333  0.474  0  1 
The grazing policy  111  0.378  0.487  0  1 
 
Households in our sample have grassland use rights since the establishment of the HRS. As 
mentioned above, more than 86% grassland has been formally allocated to groups or individual 
households in 2002. While de facto grassland property rights regimes instead of de jure regimes 
are measured by this model in which fence is an indicator. The result is consistent with the 
situation of HRS in Yanchi County that grassland is most commonly allocated to the group.  
From the tabulation of grazing policy and number of grassland leased, we can see that in 
villages with open grazing policy, the percentage is 23.81%, higher than that in villages with ban 
grazing policy (18.84%). We also tabulate grassland fence situation and grassland leased, and 
find out that the percentage of leased grassland with household grassland fence is 37.84%, higher 
than that with group grassland fence (14.29 %).The overall p value is less than 0.05(p = 0.004), 
which implies that there is significant difference in the mean of grassland leased in different 
grassland fence situations. There is perfect multi-colinearity between household fence and group 
fence when we use dummy variables including household fence, group fence, and collective 
fence, which might be resulted from only 11 observations of collective management units. In the 11 
 
following regression analysis, only one dummy of household level fence non-household fence is 
employed. 
5.3Regression results 
The impact of institutions in grazing policies, de facto grassland property rights and physical 
attributes of grassland on grassland lease are estimated by a probit model. Table 4 presents the 
results of Probit estimation. Probit 1 only examines the impact of treatment variables. In Probit 2 
and Probit 3, we include control variables measuring a household’s capital and physical 
attributes of grassland, such as location. The standard errors in Probit 1 and Probit 2 are 
measured by robust error estimation, and the standard deviations in Probit 3 are robust and 
clustered on the village level. The advantage is that it allows correlation between independent 
variables in the same cluster, which is quite common in reality. Based on probit estimation, we 
find out that property rights regimes and the grazing policy have significant impact on grassland 
lease, while the location of grassland and household characteristics are not as significant as we 
expected.  
Table4: Linear probability estimates of grassland lease decision 
Dependent variable: Rent grassland (0,1) 
  Mean of X  Probit 1  Probit 2  Probit 3 
De facto property rights regimes
#  0.3333  0.3165**  0.3279**  0.3279* 
    (0.1043)  (0.1236)  (0.1334) 
Grazing policies
#  0.3784  0.1075  0.2502* 
 
0.2502** 
  (0.08261)  (0.1052)  (0.1023) 
The location of grassland
#  0.7928  -0.08068  -0.2143 
 
-0.2143 
  (0.1126)  (0 .1404)  (0 .1660) 
Grassland area  per household    346.0  -0.00001 
 
-0.00001 
    (0.0002)  (0.0002) 
Irrigated land area per household    7.910  0.0039 
 
0.0039 
    (0.0038)  (0.0021) 
Dry land area per household    30.15  -0.0029 
 
-0.0029 
    (0.0037)  (0.0027) 
Pseudo R  
2  0.1049  0.1490  0.1490 
  observations  111  111  111 
  chi square  9.7686  16.81  32.15 
  Log pseudo likelihood  -50.69  -48.19  -48.19 
Note: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Coefficients refer to marginal effect of mean of independent 
variables. (#)The coefficient is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1. The standard errors in 
Probit 1 and Probit 2 are measured by robust error estimation. The standard errors in Probit 3 are robust and 
cluster on the village level. 
De facto property rights regimes have significantly positive impact on the probability of 
grassland lease. The probability of grassland lease will increase by 32.79% when grassland is 
managed by individual households, compared with the grassland managed by groups of 
households. This support Hypothesis 1, namely, small scale of management unit has positive 
impact on the probability of grassland lease, since small management unit with more explicitly 
fenced boundaries needs less labor to manage. In field research, we found out that in some 12 
 
villages with household grassland fence, traditional grazing (i.e., supervising the sheep through 
the whole night) has been substituted by a new way: Sheep are sent to farmers’ own grassland in 
the evening and are left with no inspection during night. Then farmers return home and herd 
sheep back in early morning. As one herder said, this way of grazing reduces the working hour 
and workload. In this way, herders can take other jobs during the day. He also admitted that 
sometimes they were caught by monitoring committee and fined for illegal grazing, but they 
continued to do so. Small management unit has positive impact on grassland lease. It might solve 
difficulties in demarcation and lower the cost of monitoring, bargaining and decision-making. 
The impact of grazing policies on grassland lease is significant and positive in both estimations, 
which is consistent with Hypothesis 2. With change from grazing ban policy to grazing open 
policy, the likelihood of grassland lease will increase by 25.02%. Admittedly, widely existing 
illegal grazing greatly challenge the assumption that no grassland lease should be appear in 
villages with grazing ban policy.  With Compared with farmers in villages with grazing ban 
policy, farmers in villages with grazing open policy are endowed with recognized and assured 
grassland use rights. Additionally, the grassland quota system further provides farmers with 
incentives to lease grassland, because it avoids conflicts caused by fuzzy  boundaries and 
property rights of grassland.  
6 Conclusions and discussions 
This paper examines the impact of formal institutions as well as biophysical and material 
conditions on the probability of grassland lease decision made by households in Yanchi County 
in the Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region, China. According to the model, grazing open policy has 
positive effects on grassland lease. Farmers responded to institutional environment. It implies 
that famers in villages with grazing ban policy have low willingness to lease grassland. Albeit 
there are illegal grazing, famers are not long-term engaged with these activities. On the other 
hand, farmers in villages with grazing open policy are endowed with high willingness with 
grassland lease, especially with support of grassland quota system.  This paper examines the 
impact of de facto rights, which relates to the problem of difficulties in demarcation in grassland. 
It is evidenced that grassland fence has positive and significant effect on the probability of 
grassland lease, and clear boundaries are important to grassland governance. As Wade (1987) 
points out, boundaries of common-pool resources matter for self-governance. Property rights 
with clear boundary overcome the difficulties in demarcation and reduce the transaction cost. 
According to our research, a village with more than 100 mu grassland per person usually has 
fenced grassland to individually household. Accordingly, grassland is a ‘quasi private goods’ 
which can be managed individually. While in other villages with quite limited grassland size, in 
particular in villages with less than 50 mu grassland per person, fence is built in group level or 
village level, which means that it is difficult or even impossible to lease grassland in some 
circumstances. As to these villages, we propose community based grassland lease in the form of 
grazing quota lease, which solves the problem of fuzzy boundaries and diminishes the possibility 
of conflict result from lease. The community based grassland lease refers to grassland use rights 13 
 
leasing within a community. As to the term ‘community’, it is not equivalent to administrative 
level community. An area could be a “community” as long as the people live within it shares the 
same informal institutions such as norms.  Accordingly, a community might be a natural village 
or a group of people with the same religion.  
We need to be aware of the potential bias resulted from the lack of information about 
household income. Local people are quite sensitive to topics about income. In the first village 
survey, the data we collected about income are hardly convincing since interviewees either 
refused to answer our questions or gave us a false reply. Therefore, instead of income, we asked 
them the percentage of income changed in last few years, which is less sensitive, but it is hard to 
integrate this variable into our modeling. In our analysis, we use the amount of arable land, sheep 
and grassland land to represent the household income. We could only count the number of 
households leasing in grassland to minimize the effect of migration. We assume that the 
determinants of land leased in are determined by the same coefficients that determine the amount 
of land leased out. This may be equivalent to the average level of the figures in reality. 
Additionally, it is hard to collect information about grassland leased out. This might be caused 
by increasing migration in rural China. Most of households leasing out grassland have migrated 
to cities to work. People living in rural areas are mainly the old and the poor who live on grazing. 
In addition, we have not solved the potential endogeneity problem which might result from the 
correlation between the amount of grassland lease and the fence situation, due to lack of strong 
evidence to find a reliable instrumental variable.  Last but not least, as a snap-shot, the 
disadvantage of a cross section analysis is that we cannot correct the bias resulted from the 
selection of villages for open grassland policy. However, in order to reduce or eliminate all the 
limitation, we combine multivariable analysis with reliable qualitative analysis, and the results 
are convincing. The future research will improve the data and explore more information about 
the topic of grassland property rights lease which is under research at present. 
Note 
1. Calculated based on data from Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region  Bureau of Statistics, 
National Bureau of Investigation Corps Ningxia (2010), Statistical Yearbook of Ningxia Hui 
Autonomous Region. Beijing: China Statistics Press. 
2. Natural villages refer to the settlements which constitute an administrative village. The 
number of households in natural village can range from 1 to 100.  
3. In research area, the usual unit used in describing grassland size is mu. 1 hectare equals to 
15 mu. 
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